The government provides oversight over projects and programs. Interestingly, this oversight often happens outside of the normal reporting structure of the government agencies. It is considered important for these overseers to be independent – not part of the organization that is sponsoring or administering the project. While this allows for some objectivity, it also means that the overseers have little “skin in the game” – they do not have to live with the consequences of their decisions. The team running the program does.
Now suppose – this is theoretical, of course, and would never happen in any situation I am familiar with, ahem – suppose that the oversight body imposed substantial burdens on the programs it oversaw. Suppose that it demanded extensive documentation that no one ever read, nit-picked on the format of the documentation, imposed supposed “best practices” that were not actually best practices, and frequently asked for data or status updates that distracted those managing the program. Suppose further that the overseers themselves were not always efficient; held up the programs while they tried to schedule review meetings, gave the programs contradictory direction, and argued amongst themselves or prepared inadequately for review meetings. The problem could be exacerbated if the overseers did not themselves have the experience of running programs, and therefore their understanding of best practices was at best theoretical, at worst superstitious.
If that – ahem – ever happened, then given the power oversight bodies have, they would essentially be ordering the programs to waste money. They might also add risk to programs. Since the job of the oversight body is ostensibly the opposite – to prevent waste and mismanagement – this could be a critical issue. What controls are in place to prevent this? Is the oversight body perhaps incentivized to make “corrections” to the programs to demonstrate its own usefulness?
Because the oversight bodies are not “inline” with the management structure over the program, they have no obligation to cultivate the program team as employees. They do not need to encourage program staff, deal with any issues of demoralization, provide positive feedback, make a comfortable work environment that will attract more great performers into program management. Oversight in such an environment runs the danger of focusing on negativity and control, rather than on successful execution.
How can we improve this? Oversight bodies must be measured by the success of the programs they oversee, not by their willingness to cancel failing programs. They must be composed of people who are experts – not in overseeing programs, but in executing them. They must work to optimize their processes and to minimize the waste they add to programs, and must solicit feedback from programs to understand what waste they are causing. What I am saying is that oversight must create value for programs, and only the programs can judge whether they do.